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Abstract 
 
 Current proposals for greenhouse gas emissions regulations in the United States 
mainly take the form of emissions caps with tradable permits.  Since Weitzman’s (1974) 
study of prices vs. quantities, economic theory predicts that a price instrument is superior 
under uncertainty in the case of stock pollutants.  Given the general belief in the political 
infeasibility of a carbon tax, there has been recent interest in two other policy instrument 
designs: hybrid policies and intensity targets.  We extend the Weitzman model to derive 
an analytical expression for the expected net benefits of a hybrid instrument under 
uncertainty.  We compare this expression to one developed by Newell and Pizer (2006) 
for an intensity target, and show the theoretical minimum correlation between GDP and 
emissions required for an intensity target to be preferred over a hybrid.  We test the 
predictions by performing Monte Carlo simulation on a computable general equilibrium 
model of the U.S. economy.  The results are similar, and we show with the numerical 
model that when marginal abatement costs are non-linear, an even higher correlation is 
required for an intensity target to be preferred over a safety valve. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As many countries prepare to begin their implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Ellerman and Buchner, 2006) and the United States begins more serious discussions of 
domestic climate policy (Paltsev et al, 2007) and potential future international 
frameworks (Stolberg, 2007), interest in alternative regulatory instruments for 
greenhouse gas emissions is increasing.  Because greenhouse gases are stock pollutants, 
we expect their marginal benefits for a given decision period (1-5 years) to have a 
negligible slope.  The seminal work by Weitzman (1974, 1978) and extended by Pizer 
(2002) and Newell and Pizer (2006) showed that under cost uncertainty and relatively flat 
marginal damages that a carbon tax equal to the expected marginal benefit is superior to 
the optimal emissions cap. 
Given the experience with an attempt at a BTU tax under the Clinton 
Administration, the prevailing view is that a carbon tax is politically infeasible, at least in 
the United States (Washington Post, 2007; Newell and Pizer, 2006).  This political 
constraint on instrument choice, combined with the significant uncertainty in abatement 
costs under a pure quantity instrument, has generated interest in two suboptimal 
instruments that are superior to quantity instruments in the presence of uncertainty: a 
hybrid or safety valve instrument, and an indexed cap or intensity target.  The safety 
valve is one in which an emissions cap is set with tradable permits allocated, but if the 
permit price exceeds some set trigger price, an unlimited number of permits are auctioned 
off at the trigger price (Pizer 2005; Jacoby and Ellerman, 2005), thus reverting to a 
carbon tax.  An indexed cap is one in which the quantity of permits allocated is set not to 
an absolute emissions target, but rather is determined relative to some other measurable 
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quantity, for example GDP, which is correlated with emissions (Newell and Pizer, 2006; 
Ellerman and Sue Wing, 2003; Sue Wing et al., 2006). 
Weitzman (1974) originally developed an expression for the relative advantage of 
prices versus quantity instruments for a pollution externality in the presence of 
uncertainty. Pizer (2002) showed that the safety valve for a stock externality under 
uncertainty is superior to a pure quantity instrument and as good as or better than a pure 
price instrument.  There have been several studies of the behavior of an indexed cap or 
intensity target under uncertainty and its relative advantages and disadvantages to 
quantity and price instruments, including Newell and Pizer (2006), Quirion (2005), and 
Sue Wing et al (2006).  In general, the advantages of index cap have been shown in the 
above studies to be a function of the correlation between emissions and the indexed 
quantity, as well as the relative slopes of marginal costs and benefits, and the variance of 
the uncertainty.  However, there have been no direct comparisons in the literature 
between indexed caps and hybrid instruments.  Since this choice between second-best 
instruments is one key element in the current debate (Paltsev et al, 2007), it is useful to 
demonstrate both theoretically and empirically when indexed caps should be preferred to 
hybrid instruments or the reverse. 
In this study, we develop a rule that indicates when indexed caps will be the 
preferred instrument for regulating a stock pollutant under uncertainty, in terms of 
expected net benefits, to a safety valve instrument.  We use the theoretical model of an 
externality developed by Weitzman (1974) and extended by Newell and Pizer (2006), 
which we present in Section 2.  In Section 3, we extend this model to first show the 
optimal trigger price for a hybrid instrument, and then derive an expression for the 
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expected net benefits under this optimal hybrid policy.  We then compare this result to 
the expression derived by Newell and Pizer for an indexed cap, and derive a general rule 
for when the indexed cap is preferred over the safety valve.  In Section 4, we illustrate the 
results by conducting uncertainty analysis on a static computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of the US economy, and show that with the non-linear marginal costs of the 
CGE model that the hybrid is even more preferable.  Section 5 gives conclusions and 
discussion. 
 
2. Model of Pollution Externality 
We begin by reviewing the basic Weitzman (1974) model and results.  Benefits 
and costs are modeled as second order Taylor Series expansions about the expected 
optimal abatement quantity target q*.  Costs and benefits, respectively, are defined as: 
 (1)  2*2*10 )(2
))(()( qqcqqccqC c −+−−+= θ  
(2) 2*2*10 )(2
)()( qqbqqbbqB −−−+=  
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The optimal abatement will be q* if and only if 11 cb = .  Since the expansion is done 
around the optimal point, marginal costs equal marginal benefits at that emissions level. 
The expected net benefits with an emission cap of  is: *qq =
(4)   00}{ cbNBE q −=
For the price instrument, emissions would be reduced up to where marginal costs equal 
the tax: 
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This is the classic result from Weitzman (1974).  The net gain from a price instrument 
relative to a quantity instrument is: 
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When the slope of the marginal costs exceeds the slope of the marginal benefits, a price 
instrument is preferred. 
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3. Second-Best instruments for Cost-Containment 
We now extend this model to represent a hybrid instrument or safety valve.  We 
will first solve for the optimal trigger price, given an emissions cap.  We then derive the 
expression for the expected net benefits of the safety valve.  Finally, we derive the 
expressions for the net gain from an intensity target relative to a safety valve, and show 
the general conditions under which each instrument is preferred.  
 
a. Optimal Design of Hybrid Instrument  
A hybrid regulatory instrument consists of both a quantity and a price instrument.  
An emissions cap is set, just as in a pure quantity instrument, and emissions permits are 
allocated among emitters, which they are allowed to trade.  In addition, the regulatory 
agency will sell additional permits at some trigger price p, for as many permits as are 
necessary.  Thus p establishes a ceiling on the permit price; it can never rise above this 
level.  If the permit price is below p, a rational agent will either buy a permit from the 
market or abate, and the regulation behaves like a quantity regime.  If the emissions limit 
is stringent enough for the permit price to rise above p, agents will buy additional permits 
from the government and, for the purposes of calculating net benefits, the regulation 
behaves like a price instrument.   
The resulting net benefits from the hybrid instrument, as for quantity and price 
instruments, depend critically on the choice of the emissions limit and the trigger price.  
As in Weitzman (1974) and in Newell and Pizer (2006), we wish to assume optimal 
choices of these design variables.  However, there is immediately a difficulty: we know 
from the Weitzman result, as summarized above, that the optimal hybrid instrument 
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consists of an emissions limit of zero (i.e., no allowances) and an optimal trigger price 
equal to the optimal pure tax.  A hybrid instrument with a non-zero emissions limit is 
inherently a second-best instrument compared with a pure price instrument, but may be 
necessary when a price instrument is not politically feasible.  We therefore proceed for 
the remainder of this paper under the assumptions that 1) a pure emissions tax is not 
feasible, and 2) the emissions limit for a hybrid instrument will be given as an outcome of 
some political process.  The question we address here is under what conditions is a hybrid 
instrument with some non-zero cap preferable to an intensity target with an equivalent 
cap. 
The first step is to solve for the optimal trigger price under a non-zero emissions 
cap.  We begin with a simplified version of the model from section 2 to motivate this 
result.  Assume that the cost uncertainty cθ  is a two-state discrete distribution: 
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When Lθθ = , the price instrument will be in effect, since the marginal cost is higher than 
the expected value. Conversely, when Hθθ = , marginal costs are lower, and the quantity 
instrument will be in effect.   
 The second assumption is that the emissions limit q* under the hybrid instrument 
is the optimal quantity under the pure quantity instrument.  When Hθθ =  and the cap is 
in effect, the optimal emissions will be: .  When *qq = Lθθ =  and the price instrument is 
in effect, the optimal emissions will be:  
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Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to p, setting equal to zero, and 
multiplying through by  gives 22c
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In the general case, the optimal trigger price will be a weighted average between the 
marginal benefits and the marginal cost in the high cost case, where the relative weight of 
the terms depends on the relative slopes of marginal costs and benefits.  In general, the 
optimal trigger price will be higher than the marginal benefits (the optimal price for a 
pure price instrument.  However, in the special case of a stock pollutant, such as 
greenhouse gases, it has been suggested (Pizer, 1999) that can be treated as 
approximately zero (constant marginal benefits).  In this special case, the optimal trigger 
price reduces to simply .  The optimal trigger price for a hybrid instrument for a 
stock pollutant is the same as the optimal tax, equal to the marginal benefits.  Because the 
2b
1
* bp =
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optimal trigger price does not depend on the choice of emissions limit q*, this result 
holds for any choice of emissions limit q for the hybrid. 
 Note that this result for the optimal trigger price is not a new result.  This is 
simply the ceiling price for the hybrid policy of Roberts and Spence (1976).  Roberts and 
Spence showed that for a general pollution externality, the optimal instrument was a 
hybrid with an emissions cap, a ceiling price, and a floor price (or subsidy), which is 
preferred over a pure cap or a pure tax.  The intuition is that the step function created by 
policy approximates the marginal benefit function.  Roberts and Spence noted that for the 
special case of constant marginal benefits, their optimal hybrid converges to a pure price 
instrument equal to the marginal benefits. 
 
b. Expected Net benefits of Hybrid Instrument  
For the remainder of this paper, we will restrict our consideration to pure stock 
pollutants (such as long-lived greenhouse gases) for which we will assume that the 
marginal benefits in any single period are essentially constant; i.e., we assume b2 equals 
zero.  As the above discussion has shown, for this case the optimal trigger price is equal 
to the marginal benefits at the expected level of abatement (q*).  We can now relax the 
assumption of a discrete distribution of the cost uncertaintyθ , and allow any distribution 
such that 0}{ =θE and . 2)( σθ =VAR
For any distribution of θ  around zero, the trigger price will be activated with 
probability π, and the emissions limit will be binding with probability 1- π.  The expected 
net benefits of a hybrid instrument under these conditions is: 
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Thus the additional net benefit of a hybrid relative to a quantity instrument is: 
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For example, if the distribution for θ  is symmetric, then π  = 1 – π = 0.5 and the 
advantage of the safety valve relative to a quantity instrument is exactly half the 
advantage of the price instrument over the quantity instrument, 
2
qp
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−
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c. Safety Valve Vs. General Indexed Quantity 
Newell and Pizer (2006) extended the Weitzman model to represent intensity 
targets.  Intensity targets, where the emissions limit is determined from the GDP which is 
uncertain and a desired emissions intensity ratio, fall under the general category of 
indexed quantity instruments.  The most general form of indexed quantities, which 
Newell and Pizer refer to as a General Indexed Quantity (GIQ) chooses emissions q as a 
linear function of another random variable x as 
(17)  rxaxq +=)(
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Where a and r are policy design variables, and xxE =}{ , , and 2)var( xx σ=
cxx σθ =),cov( .  Newell and Pizer show that the optimal choice of an indexed quantity is 
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 We are interested here in when a hybrid instrument is preferred over an intensity 
target or vice versa.  When the distribution of θ  is symmetric, the expected net benefits 
of the hybrid is as given in equation (14).  Comparing with (19), the indexed quantity will 
be preferred when 
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Rearranging to solve for ρ , the intensity target is preferred when 
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For the case of a stock pollutant, where 02 ≅b , this simplifies to 
(21) πρ >cx . 
For example, if the distribution is symmetric and the probability of activating the trigger 
price is ½, then the intensity target would be preferred when the correlation  
exceeds
cxρ
71.02/1 ≅ .  As one should expect, the indexed quantity instrument is preferred 
when the correlation between emissions and the index quantity (e.g., GDP) is high 
enough.  If the correlation were perfect, 1=ρ , then the indexed quantity is preferable.  If 
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there was no correlation, 0=ρ , the hybrid would be preferred.  The correlation for which 
one should be indifferent between the two instruments is the square root of the 
probability of the trigger price activating under the hybrid. 
 
d. Safety Valve vs. Indexed Quantity 
The most common form of intensity target under consideration in climate policy 
discussions would not take the most general form of the indexed quantity as described 
above.  Newell and Pizer point out that a GDP intensity target would set the variable a in 
equation (19) to zero.  They refer to this instrument as an Indexed Quantity (IQ), in 
contrast to the GIQ above, and its optimal form is: 
(22)  xrxqIQ
** )( =
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if 0≠cxρ , the expected net benefits for the indexed quantity is 
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Comparing the net benefits for the IQ (equation 23) with the net benefits for the 
hybrid (equation 14), the critical correlation where the relative net benefits of IQ are 
positive is a quadratic function of the ratio of the coefficient of variation (the standard 
deviation relative to the mean) of the indexed quantity (GDP) to the coefficient of 
variation of the emissions, .  We plot this relationship for a wide range of possible 
values of and  for a distribution of θ where π = 0.5 (Figure 1).  If this ratio is less 
qx vv /
xv qv
 12 
than 0.25 or greater than 1.8, the hybrid instrument is always preferred.  Thus the 
intensity target is most useful in cases where the magnitude of the uncertainties in cost 
and the index are roughly comparable, as also suggested by Newell and Pizer.  For ratios 
between 0.25 and 1.8, the minimum correlation for which one would be indifferent 
between the two instruments follows the curve in Figure 1.  Note that a ratio of 
 (corresponding to 71.0/ =qx vv 1)/( =cxqx vv ρ ), the indexed quantity has the same 
indifference correlation as the general indexed quantity, 2/1 . 
 
4. Numerical Example 
We illustrate the above analytical expressions by performing an uncertainty 
analysis on a computable general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy, and show the 
conditions under which an intensity target will be preferred to a safety valve or vice 
versa.  We first briefly describe the model and the uncertainty analysis, then give the 
results from the model and compare to the analytical model from the previous section. 
 
a. Model Description 
We test the predictions of the preferred instrument using a static CGE model of 
the U.S. The model treats households as an aggregate representative agent with constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences. Industries are consolidated into the 11 
sectoral groupings shown in Table 3, and are treated as representative firms with nested 
CES production technology. For this purpose we adapt Bovenberg and Goulder’s (1996) 
KLEM production technology and parameterization, as shown in Figure 2. Additional 
details are given in the appendix. 
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The model’s algebraic structure is numerically calibrated using U.S. data on inter-
industry economic flows, primary factor demands, commodity uses and emissions in the 
year 2004. We simulate prices, economic quantities, and emissions of CO2 in the year 
2015 by scaling both the economy’s aggregate factor endowment and the coefficients on 
energy within industries’ cost functions and the representative agent’s expenditure 
function. The probability distributions of these scaling factors, when propagated through 
the model, give rise to probability distributions for the future value of baseline national 
income, energy use and emissions. 
The parameters which govern the malleability of production are the elasticities of 
substitution between composites of primary factors (KL) and intermediate inputs (EM), 
which we denote σKLEM; between inputs of capital (K) and labor (L), denoted by σKL; 
between energy (E) and materials (M), indicated by σEM; and among different 
intermediate energy and material commodities (e and m), denoted by σE and σM, 
respectively. In natural resource-dependent sectors (e.g., production of primary fuels such 
as coal) the resource is modeled as a fixed factor which enters at the top of the production 
hierarchy, governed by the elasticity σR. The electric power sector encompasses two 
nested production structures, one for primary electricity generated from fixed factors 
(e.g., nuclear, hydro and wind) which exhibits features of resource-dependent sectors, and 
another representing fossil fuel generation which exhibits features of non-resource 
sectors. Probability distributions for these seven parameters, when propagated through 
the model, generate probability distributions for the changes in income and emissions 
from their baseline levels in response to climate policy. 
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b. Parametric Uncertainty 
For this analysis of near-term carbon abatement policies, we consider uncertainty 
in three categories of parameters: the GDP growth rate of the economy between 2005 and 
2015, the rate of autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI), and the elasticities 
of substitution in the production functions. We briefly summarize here the probability 
distributions for the uncertainty parameters, and a detailed description can be found in 
(Webster et al., 2007). 
Annual GDP growth rates are modeled as a random walk with drift (Stock and 
Watson, 1988; Schwartz and Smith, 2000).  The volatility is estimated from GDP time 
series data for the U.S. economy from 1970-2000 (BEA, 2007).  For projecting from 
2005 to 2015, instead of the historical mean growth rate, we use the reference EIA 
forecast (EIA, 2007) growth rate of 3% per annum.  Our estimated volatility results in a 
distribution of future growth rates with +/- one standard deviation almost identical to the 
EIA high and low growth cases. 
The AEEI parameter has a reference (mean) value of 1.0% p.a., consistent with 
many other energy economic models (Azar and Dowlatabadi, 1999).  The uncertainty in 
AEEI is assumed to be normal with a standard deviation of 0.4% based on several 
analyses (Scott et al., 1999; Webster et al., 2002). 
The uncertainties in the elasticities of substitution are based on literature survey of 
econometric estimates with published standard errors.  The details of this survey and the 
synthesis of the standard errors into a probability distribution for each elasticity are 
documented fully in Webster et al (2007).  The empirical probability distributions for 
each of these parameters are summarized in Table 1, along with representative statistics. 
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c. Results of CGE Model 
We perform Monte Carlo simulation on the CGE model, drawing 1000 random 
samples of parameter values. In addition to the reference (no policy) case, we impose 
four types of policy constraints: an emissions cap, a carbon tax, a safety valve, and an 
intensity target.  The stringency of the emissions cap is defined as the expected CO2 
abatement under the McCain-Lieberman Senate Bill (Paltsev et al., 2007) of 2100 Mt 
CO2, leaving U.S. emissions in 2015 at 5000 Mt CO2, and at a marginal cost of $23/ton 
CO2.  We define all other policy instruments such that they will be equivalent in the mean 
case; the carbon tax is $23/ ton CO2, the trigger price of the safety valve is $23/ton CO2, 
and the intensity target requires an emissions/GDP ratio to be the same as that which 
results under the quantity instrument in the mean case.  Finally, a critical assumption in 
the results shown here is that the marginal benefit of CO2 abatement in 2015 is assumed 
to be $23/ton CO2; i.e., we assume that the imposed policies are all optimal in the no-
uncertainty case. 
 The mean and standard deviations for key results are given in Table 2.  The 
expected abatement of CO2 is the same for all instruments except the safety valve, which 
abates less than the others.  The safety valve also has greater uncertainty in the abatement 
than either the tax or intensity targets, but less than the emissions cap. The uncertainty in 
marginal costs of abatement are greatest for the cap and no uncertainty for the tax (by 
definition), with the safety valve having the next smallest uncertainty.  Expected net 
benefits (calculated assuming a marginal benefit of abatement of $23/ton) are, consistent 
with theory, greatest for the tax and least for the cap.  The safety valve and the intensity 
target have similar expected net benefits, but the intensity target is preferred.  The 
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correlation between GDP and emissions in the no policy case is calculated as 0.87, so this 
is consistent with the expressions in Section 3. 
To further test the consistency between the CGE and analytical models, we 
construct an experiment to artificially vary the correlation between GDP and emissions in 
the Monte Carlo simulation.  We cannot directly impose a correlation, since the 
emissions are an endogenous function of GDP growth and other factors.  Instead, we 
artificially increase or decrease the variance of the GDP growth rate uncertainty, while 
holding constant the variance of AEEI and the elasticities of substitution.  This procedure 
causes the correlation between GDP and emissions to vary across different sets of 
random samples.  
Six different sets of random samples are drawn, with correlation between GDP 
and emissions ranging from 0.65 to 0.93.  The value of correlation for which one would 
be indifferent between the intensity and safety valve instruments is 0.86 (Figure 3).  In 
contrast, the coefficients of variation for GDP and emissions from the CGE model are 
0.79 and 0.84, respectively, giving a ratio  equal to 0.94.  The relationship plotted 
in Figure 1 predicts an indifference correlation value of 0.74 for these parameter values. 
qx vv /
The divergence in the indifference point correlation between the CGE model and 
the analytical model results from the non-linearity of the marginal abatement cost from 
the model.  Our analytical model, like Weitzman’s model, assumes linear marginal costs, 
whereas the marginal costs predicted by the CGE model are approximately cubic (Figure 
4).  A non-linear marginal cost curve favors a policy in which the expected abatement is 
lower than the optimal abatement under certainty (the reference cap), because beyond the 
point of optimal abatement marginal costs are steeply increasing.  As an illustration, we 
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use the average marginal abatement cost curve from 1000 runs of the CGE model (Figure 
5), and calculate the loss in net benefits from 1000mmt more or less than optimal 
abatement; the net benefit loss in area B, $14,797B, is more than twice that of area A, 
$8,873B.  A safety valve will always result in abatement less than or equal to the 
reference cap, while an intensity target may require abatement either above or below the 
reference cap.   Non-linear marginal costs thus induce a bias in favor of the safety valve, 
as the instrument operates solely in the region where marginal costs are favorable.  We 
should thus expect that the CGE model with cubic marginal costs will predict a higher 
indifference point correlation than the analytical model, which is what we see here.   
To test this hypothesis, one would ideally perform an identical experiment except 
with linear marginal abatement costs.  However, there is no simple way to modify a CGE 
model to induce global linearity.  As an approximation, we impose a less stringent 
emissions target (6200mmt) in the CGE model, such that the relevant portion of the 
marginal cost curve is nearly linear.  We repeat the above Monte Carlo experiments, for 
several different assumed variances for the GDP uncertainty, and calculate the expected 
net benefits under the hybrid and indexed instruments (Figure 3).  Under the less 
stringent target, the critical value of correlation for which the intensity target becomes 
preferred over the safety valve is 0.74, as predicted by the analytical model.   
The preferred policy instrument is thus dependent on the slope of the marginal 
cost curve over the span of potential abatement.  Because the actual economy is unlikely 
to have strictly linear marginal abatement costs, the range of conditions in which the 
intensity target is preferable to the safety valve, especially given a reasonably stringent 
emissions target, is probably quite narrow. 
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5. Discussion 
Given the uncertainty in economic growth and the cost of abating CO2 emissions, 
an emissions cap chosen today for some future year has the potential for extremely high 
welfare loss.  The preferable economic instrument for a stock pollutant, a carbon tax, 
seems politically infeasible at least in the U.S. and perhaps in other countries as well.  
This leads to interest in either a safety valve or an intensity target as a regulatory 
instrument that has less uncertainty in the cost of abatement and welfare losses.   
Our analysis has shown that, if both instruments are optimally designed, a high 
level of correlation (at least 0.7 and often higher) between the cost uncertainty and the 
index uncertainty are required to justify the choice of an intensity target as a regulatory 
instrument over a safety valve.  The design details of the actual policy are critical to the 
choice between instruments.  For example, a hybrid with a trigger price much lower than 
the marginal benefits will be much less efficient, and an intensity target may be superior. 
The analysis presented here focuses exclusively on a single period of relatively 
few years.  For longer time frames divided into multiple periods, an additional question is 
how banking and borrowing of emissions permits would perform relative to either a 
safety valve or an intensity target.  Finally, there is a question about how a single period 
analysis that allows emissions to be higher or lower in response to uncertainty can be 
made consistent with a long-term target, such as concentration stabilization, where less 
abatement in one period must be compensated by abatement in another period. 
 
 
 
 19 
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported by a grant from the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation (#).  The 
authors are grateful for helpful comments from Mustafa Babiker, Denny Ellerman, Karen 
Fisher-Vanden, Gib Metcalf, and Marcus Sarofim. 
 20 
References 
Armington, P.S. (1969). A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of 
Production (Une théorie de la demande de produits différenciés d'après leur 
origine) (Una teoría de la demanda de productos distinguiéndolos según el lugar 
de producción). Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund 16 (1) (Mar., 1969) 
pp. 159-178. 
Azar, C. and H. Dowlatabadi (1999).  “A Review of Technical Change in Assessment of 
Climate Policy.” Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, 24: 513-44.   
Bovenberg, A.L. and L.H. Goulder (1996). Costs of environmentally motivated taxes in 
the Presence of other taxes: general equilibrium analyses, American Economic 
Review 86: 985-1006. 
Brooke, A., D. Kendrick, A. Meeraus, and R. Raman (1998). GAMS: A User’s Guide, 
Washington DC: GAMS Development Corp. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007). “Current-dollar and ‘real’ GDP,” National 
Economic Accounts. http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm. 
Dirkse, S.P. and M.C. Ferris (1995). The PATH Solver: A Non-Monotone Stabilization 
Scheme for Mixed Complementarity Problems, Optimization Methods and 
Software 5: 123-156. 
Ellerman, A.D., & B. Buchner (December 2006). “Over-Allocation or Abatement? A 
Preliminary Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme Based on the 2005 
Emissions Data,” Report No. 141, Joint Program on the Science and Policy of 
Global Change, MIT, Cambridge, MA. Or see 
http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rpt141.pdf. 
 21 
Ellerman, A. D. and I. Sue Wing (2003). “Absolute vs. Intensity-Based Emission Caps,” 
Climatic Policy 3 (Supplement 2): S7-S20. 
Energy Information Agency (2007). Annual Energy Outlook 2007 with Projections to 
2030. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/index.html. 
Harrison, G.W., D. Tarr and T.F. Rutherford (1997). Quantifying the Uruguay Round, 
Economic Journal 107: 1405-1430. 
Jacoby, H.D. & A.D. Ellerman (2004). “The Safety Valve and Climate Policy,” Energy 
Policy 32 (4): 481-491.  
Mathiesen, L. (1985a). Computational Experience in Solving Equilibrium Models by a 
Sequence of Linear Complementarity Problems, Operations Research 33: 1225-
1250. 
Mathiesen, L. (1985b). Computation of Economic Equilibria by a Sequence of Linear 
Complementarity Problems, Mathematical Programming Study 23: 144-162. 
Newell, R. G. and W. A. Pizer (2006).  “Indexed Regulation,” Resources for the Future 
Discussion Paper DP 06-32.  http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-06-32.pdf. 
Paltsev, S., J. Reilly, H. Jacoby, A. Gurgel, G. Metcalf, A. Sokolov & J. Holak (April 
2007). “Assessment of U.S. Cap-and-Trade Proposals,” Report No. 146, Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, MIT, Cambridge, MA. Or 
see http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rpt146.pdf. 
Pizer, W. A. (2002).  “Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate 
change,” Journal of Public Economics 85: 409-434. 
 22 
Pizer, W. A. (1999). “Optimal Choice of Policy Instrument and Stringency under 
Uncertainty: The Case of Climate Change,” Resource and Energy Economics 21: 
255-287. 
Pizer, W. A. (2005).  “Climate Policy Design under Uncertainty,” Resources for the 
Future Discussion Paper DP 05-44.  http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-05-
44.pdf. 
Quirion, P. (2005). “Does Uncertainty Justify Intensity Emissions Caps?” Resource and 
Energy Economics 27: 343-353. 
Roberts M. J. and M. Spence (1976).  “Effluent Charges and Licenses under 
Uncertainty.” Journal of Public Economics 5: 193-208. 
Rutherford, T.F. (1999). Applied General Equilibrium Modeling with MPSGE as a 
GAMS Subsystem: An Overview of the Modeling Framework and Syntax, 
Computational Economics 14: 1-46. 
Scarf, H. (1973). The Computation of Economic Equilibria, New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Schwartz, E. and J. E. Smith (2000).  “Short-Term Variations and Long-Term Dynamics 
in Commodity Prices,” Management Science 46 (7): 893-911. 
Scott, M. J., R. D. Sands, J. Edmonds, A. M. Liebetrau, and D. W. Engel (1999). 
“Uncertainty in Integrated Assessment Models: Modeling with MiniCAM 1.0.” 
Energy Policy 27 (14): 597. 
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (1988).  “Variable Trends in Economic Time Series,” The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (3): 147-174. 
 23 
Stolberg, S. G. (2007). “At Group of 8 Meeting, Bush Rebuffs Germany on Cutting 
Emissions.”  New York Times, June 7, 2007. 
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/mort/My%20Documents/Research/ENT
ICE/LISA/NYTimes%20article%20-%20EU%20target.htm. 
Sue Wing, I., A.D. Ellerman & J. Song (2006). “Absolute vs. Intensity Limits for CO2 
Emission Control: Performance under Uncertainty” Report No. 130, Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, MIT, Cambridge, MA. Or 
see http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rpt130.pdf. 
Sue Wing, I. (2004). Computable General Equilibrium Models and Their Use in 
Economy-Wide Policy Analysis: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know (But 
Were Afraid to Ask), MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global 
Change Technical Note No. 6, Cambridge MA. 
Sue Wing, I. (2006). The Synthesis of Bottom-Up and Top-Down Approaches to Climate 
Policy Modeling: Electric Power Technologies and the Cost of Limiting U.S. CO2 
Emissions, Energy Policy 34: 3847-3869. 
Webster, M.D., M. Babiker, M. Mayer, J.M. Reilly, J. Harnisch, M.C. Sarofim, and C. 
Wang (2002). “Uncertainty in Emissions Projections for Climate Models.”  
Atmospheric Environment 36 (22) 3659-3670. 
Webster, M. D., I. Sue Wing , L. Jakobovits, and T. Felgenhauer (2007).  “Uncertainty in 
costs and abatement from near-term carbon reduction policies in the U.S.”  
(working paper). 
Weitzman, M. L. (1974).  “Prices vs. Quantities,” The Review of Economic Studies 41 
(4): 477-491. 
 24 
Weitzman, M. L. (1978).  “Optimal rewards for Economic Regulation,” American 
Economic Review 68 (4): 683-691. 
 
 25 
Table 1: Uncertain Parameter Distributions for Monte Carlo Simulations 
f q kl em e m
Mean 1.0 2.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
Standard Deviation 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5
0.025 0.2 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1
0.05 0.3 1.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2
0.25 0.7 2.3 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
0.5 1.0 2.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.75 1.3 3.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.4
0.95 1.7 4.1 1.8 1.8 2.3 1.7 1.8 1.9
0.975 1.8 4.4 1.9 2.0 2.5 1.8 2.0 2.0
Elasticities of SubstitutionAEEI 
(%/yr)
GDP Growth 
(%/yr)
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Table 2: Results of Monte Carlo Simulations 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Cap 2052 593 23.0 10.8 23231 5118
Tax 2099 322 22.7 0.0 25341 3738
Safety Valve 1887 453 18.7 5.1 24273 4451
Intensity 2108 316 23.8 7.7 24363 4423
Abatement (Mt CO2) Carbon Price ($/ton CO2) Net Benefits ($M)
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Figure 1: Critical correlation between index and cost uncertainty for indexed quantity 
instrument to be preferred over hybrid, as a function of the ratio of the coefficients of 
variation for indexed quantity x and emissions q. 
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Figure 2. The Structure of Production in the CGE Model. 
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Figure 3:  Relative advantage of intensity target to safety valve as a function of 
correlation between GDP and baseline emissions.  For an emissions target of 5000 mmt, a 
higher correlation (at least 0.86) is necessary for the intensity target to be the preferred 
instrument. For a less stringent target (6200 mmt), for which the relevant portion of the 
MAC curve is nearly linear, the indifference point between the intensity target and safety 
valve occurs at 0.74, as was predicted by the analytical model.   
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Figure 4: Uncertainty in marginal abatement costs in computable general equilibrium 
model as a result of uncertainty in GDP growth, AEEI, and elasticities of substitution. 
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Figure 5: Loss in expected net benefits in CGE model from abatement 1000mmt less than 
optimal and 1000mmt more than optimal.  Area A represents the net benefits lost from 
abating too little ($8,873B), which is substantially smaller than area B, the net benefits 
lost from abating too much ($14,797B).   
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Appendix: Description of the CGE Model 
The simulations in the paper are constructed using a simple static CGE simulation 
of the U.S. economy. The model treats households as a representative agent, aggregates 
the firms in the economy into 11 industry sectors, and solves for a static equilibrium in 
the year 2015. 
 
A.1 Model Structure 
The model is a simplified version of that developed by Sue Wing (2006). It 
represents the U.S. in the small open economy format of Harrison et al (1997). Imports 
and exports are linked by a balance-of-payments constraint, commodity inputs to 
production or final uses are modeled as Armington (1969) CES composites of imported 
and domestically-produced varieties, and industries’ production for export and the 
domestic market are modeled according to constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
functions of their output. 
Commodities (indexed by i) are of two types, energy goods (coal, oil, natural gas 
and electricity, denoted ) and non-energy goods (denoted ). Each good is 
produced by a single industry (indexed by j), which is modeled as a representative firm 
that generates output (Y) from inputs of primary factors (v) and intermediate uses of 
Armington commodities (x). 
ie ⊂ im ⊂
Households are modeled as a representative agent who is endowed with three 
factors of production, labor (L), capital (K) and industry-specific natural resources (R), 
indexed by f = {L, K, R}. The supply of capital is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. The 
endowments of the different natural resources increase with the prices of domestic output 
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in the industries to which these resources correspond, according to sector-specific supply 
elasticities, ηR. Income from the agent’s rental of these factors to the firms finances her 
consumption of commodities, consumption of a government good, and savings. 
The representative agent’s preferences are modeled according to a CES 
expenditure function. The agent is assumed to exhibit constant marginal propensity to 
save, so that savings make up a constant fraction of aggregate expenditure. The 
government sector is modeled as a passive entity which demands commodities and 
transforms them into a government good, which in turn serves as an input to both 
consumption and investment. Aggregate investment and government output are produced 
according to CES transformation functions of the goods produced by the industries in the 
economy. The demand for investment goods is specified according to a balanced growth 
path rule. 
Production in industries is represented by the multi-level CES cost functions 
shown schematically in Figure 2, which are adaptations of Bovenberg and Goulder’s 
(1996) structure. Each node of the tree in the diagram represents the output of an 
individual CES function, and the branches denote its inputs. Thus, in the non-resource 
based production sectors shown in panel A, output (Yj) is a CES function of a composite 
of labor and capital inputs (KLj) and a composite of energy and material inputs (EMj). KLj 
represents the value added by primary factors’ contribution to production, and is a CES 
function of inputs of labor, vLj, and capital, vKj. EMj represents the value of intermediate 
inputs’ contribution to production, and is a CES function of two further composites: Ej, 
which is itself a CES function of energy inputs, xej, and Mj, which is a CES function of 
non-energy material inputs, xmj. 
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The production structure of resource-based industries is shown in panel B. In line 
with its importance to production in these industries, the natural resource is modeled as a 
sector-specific fixed factor whose input enters at the top level of the hierarchical 
production function. Output is thus a CES function of the resource input, vRj, and the 
composite of the inputs of capital, labor, energy and materials (KLEMj) to that sector. In 
both resource-based and non-resource-based industries, input substitutability at the 
various levels of the nesting structure is controlled by the values of the corresponding 
elasticities: σKLEM, σKL, σEM, σE, σM and σR. 
The production function for electric power embodies characteristics of both 
primary and non-primary sectors described above. The top-down model therefore 
represents the electricity sector as an amalgam of the production functions in panels A 
and B. Conventional fossil electricity production combines labor, capital and materials 
with inputs of coal, oil and natural gas according to the production structure in panel A. 
Nuclear and renewable electricity are generated by combining labor, capital and 
intermediate materials with a composite of non-fossil fixed-factor energy resources such 
as uranium deposits, wind energy and hydrostatic head using a production function 
similar to that in panel B, but without the fossil fuel composite, E. The resulting 
production structure is shown in panel C, where total output is a CES function of the 
outputs of the fossil (F) and non-fossil (NF) electricity production sub-sectors. The 
elasticity of substitution between yF and yNF is σF-NF >> 1, reflecting the fact that they are 
near-perfect substitutes. 
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A.2 Model Formulation, Numerical Calibration and Solution 
The economy is formulated in the complementarity format of general equilibrium 
(Scarf 1973; Mathiesen 1985a, b). Profit maximization by industries and utility 
maximization by the representative agent give rise to vectors of demands for 
commodities and factors. These demands are functions of goods and factor prices, 
industries’ activity levels and the income level of the representative agent. Combining the 
demands with the general equilibrium conditions of market clearance, zero-profit and 
income balance yields a square system of nonlinear inequalities that forms the aggregate 
excess demand correspondence of the economy (Sue Wing 2004). The CGE model solves 
this system as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) using numerical techniques. 
The mathematical relations which define the excess demand correspondence are 
numerically calibrated on a social accounting matrix (SAM) for U.S. economy in the year 
2004, using values for the elasticities of substitution (based on Bovenberg and Goulder 
1996) and factor supply summarized in Table 2. The basic SAM is constructed using 
2004 Bureau of Labor Statistics data on input-output transactions, BEA data on the 
components of GDP by industry, and EIA data on the disposition of energy use. The 
resulting benchmark table was then aggregated according to the industry groupings in 
Table A.1. 
The economic accounts do not record the contributions to the various sectors of 
the economy of key natural resources that are germane to the climate problem. Sue Wing 
(2001) employs information from a range of additional sources to approximate these 
values as shares of the input of capital to the agriculture, oil and gas, mining, coal, and 
electric power, and rest-of-economy industries. Applying these shares allows the value of 
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natural resource inputs to be disaggregated from the factor supply matrix, with the value 
of capital being decremented accordingly. 
The electric power sector in the SAM is disaggregated into fossil and non-fossil 
electricity production (yF and yNF, respectively) using the share of primary electricity (i.e., 
nuclear and renewables) in total net generation for the year 2000, given in DOE/EIA 
(2004). The corresponding share of the electric sector’s labor, capital and non-fuel 
intermediate inputs is allocated to the between non-fossil sub-sector, as is the entire 
endowment of the electric sector’s natural resource. The remainder of the labor, capital 
and intermediate materials, along with all of the fuel inputs to electricity, are allocated to 
the fossil sub-sector. 
The final SAM, shown in Figure A-2, along with the parameters in Table A-1, 
specify the numerical calibration point for the static sub-model. The latter is formulated 
as an MCP and numerically calibrated using the MPSGE subsystem (Rutherford 1999) 
for GAMS (Brooke et al 1998) before being solved using the PATH solver (Dirkse and 
Ferris 1995). 
 
A.3 Dynamic Projections and Policy Analysis 
Projections of future output energy use and emissions of CO2 are constructed by 
simulating the growth of the economy in 2015. To do this we update the economy’s 
endowments of labor and capital and its supply of net imports, and the growth of energy-
saving technical progress. 
To keep the analysis simple we assume that the model’s base-year endowments of 
labor, capital and sector-specific natural resources grow at a common, exogenous rate. 
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This is implemented by means of a scaling parameter whose value is specified to increase 
from unity in the base year at a rate equal to the long-run average annual growth of GDP, 
3 percent in the reference case, and varied under uncertainty. 
Single-region open-economy simulations require the modeler to make 
assumptions about the characteristics of international trade and the current account over 
the simulation horizon. Since trade is not our primary focus, we simply reduce the 
economy’s base-year current account deficit from the benchmark level at the constant 
rate of one percent per year. 
We account for energy use and emissions by scaling the exajoules of energy used 
and megatons of CO2 emitted in the base year according to the growth in the 
corresponding quantity indices of Armington energy demand. We do this by constructing 
energy-output factors (χE) and emissions-output factors (χC), each of which assumes a 
fixed relationship between the benchmark values of the coal, refined oil and natural gas 
use in the SAM and the delivered energy and the carbon emission content of these goods 
in the benchmark year.1 The resulting coefficients, whose values are shown in Table A-1, 
are applied to the quantities of the corresponding Armington energy goods solved for by 
the model at each time-step. Finally, to project the key future declines in the energy- and 
emissions-GDP ratios, we reduce the coefficients on energy commodities in the model's 
cost and expenditure functions. We do this through the use of an augmentation factor 
whose value declines at the rates of growth of the AEEI assumed in the text. 
                                                 
1 Fossil-fuel energy supply and carbon emissions in the base year were divided by commodity use in the 
SAM, which we calculated as gross output – net exports. In the year 2000, U.S. primary energy demands 
for coal, petroleum and natural gas and electricity were 23.9, 40.5, 25.2, and 14.8 exajoules, respectively 
(DOE/EIA 2004). The corresponding benchmark emissions of CO2 from the first three fossil fuels were 
2112, 2439 and 1244 MT, respectively (DOE/EIA 2003). Aggregate uses of these energy commodities in 
the SAM are 21.8, 185.6, 107.1 and 6.21 billion dollars. 
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Table A.1. Sectors in the CGE Model 
CGE model sectors Constituent industries (approximate 2-digit SIC) 
Agriculture Agriculture 
Coal Coal mining 
Crude oil & gas Crude oil & gas 
Natural gas Natural gas 
Petroleum Petroleum 
Electricity  Electricity 
Energy-intensive industries Paper and allied; Chemicals; Rubber & plastics; Stone, clay & Glass; Primary metals 
Manufacturing Food & allied; Tobacco; Textile mill products; Apparel; Lumber & wood; Furniture 
& fixtures; Printing, publishing & allied; Leather; Fabricated metal; Non-electrical 
machinery; Electrical machinery; Motor vehicles; Transportation equipment & 
ordnance; Instruments; Misc. manufacturing 
Transportation Transportation 
Services Communications; Trade; Finance, insurance & real estate; Government enterprises 
Rest of economy Metal mining; Non-metal mining; Construction 
 
Table A.2. Substitution and Supply Elasticities 
Sector σKL a σE b σA c σR d ηR e χE f χC g  All Sectors 
Agriculture 0.68 1.45 2.31 0.4 0.5 – –   σKLEM h 0.7 
Crude Oil & Gas 0.68 1.45 5.00 0.4 1.0 – –  σEM i 0.7 
Coal 0.80 1.08 1.14 0.4 2.0 1.0956 0.0969  σM j 0.6 
Refined Oil 0.74 1.04 2.21 – – 0.2173 0.0131  σT k 1.0 
Natural Gas 0.96 1.04 1.00 – – 0.2355 0.0116    
Electricity 0.81 0.97 1.00 0.4 0.5 0.2381 –  Electricity 
Energy Intensive Mfg. 0.94 1.08 2.74 – – – –  σF-NF l 8 
Transportation 0.80 1.04 1.00 – – – –    
Manufacturing 0.94 1.08 2.74 – – – –    
Services 0.80 1.81 1.00 – – – –    
Rest of the Economy 0.98 1.07 1.00 0.4 1.0 – –    
 
a Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor; b Inter-fuel elasticity of substitution; c Armington 
elasticity of substitution; d Elasticity of substitution between KLEM composite and natural resources; e 
Elasticity of natural resource supply with respect to output price; f Energy-output factor (GJ/$); g CO2 
emission factor (Tons/$); h Elasticity of substitution between value added and energy-materials composite; i 
Elasticity of substitution between energy and material composites; j Elasticity of substitution among 
intermediate materials; k Elasticity of output transformation between domestic and exported commodity 
types; l Elasticity of substitution between fossil and non-fossil electric output. 
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